INTRODUCTION
Insight Is that flash of Illumination during which a problem solver exclaims OAhal' and sees (or thinks 1he see) the answer. To have an Insight, one must first have a problem that constitutes something of a puzzle. It the problem is difficutt for merely technical reasons (e.g. the following of a "on and tedious algorithm), there is little room for Insight. However, It the problem requires that one or more of Its elements be thought of In a new way, then Insight seems quite likely.
There Is good evidence that Insight often follows rapidly after the problem solver represents the problem In a new way (Kaplan & Smon I6 Prws) . UnfoVIflmatey, tquite difficult to collect psychological data at the exact moment of Insight since human subjects awe almost universally silen Jus before the AHAL . This report presents a computer simulation of how subjects might, change representation and how that representation might lead to the solution of an Infamous insigh problem, the MutNaed Checkerboard problem. Subjects are asked to imagine that they have 31 dominos, each of which is capable of covering two squares if it is placed on the checkerboard either horizontally or vertically. Diagonal placement is not allowed. The task is to detezuine if-it is possible to cover the 62 remaining squares using the 31 domino. A covering must be shown, or the subject must logically prove why a. coverin is Impossible to produce.
In fact no, covering exists. An Insightful way toprove this fact is to notice that a domnIno must cover a black and a whit square no matter how It Is placed on the board. Since all 31 dominos must be used If an area of 62 square Is to be covered, there must be equal numbers Of black and whit squares (each pair corresponding to one domino placement) for the problem to be possible. However, an examination of Figure 1 revealha In rernoftn the diagonally opposite comers, we have removed two white squares.
That means twer are two rm blacfs than whltei left on the board, mnd the problem Is imprsslble to solve.
Task:
Cover the 62 remaining squares using 31 dominos. Each domino covers two adjacent squares.
Or: Prove logically why such a covering is impossible. Elsewhere the Interesting characteistics of the MC problem and of solution attempts by human subjects wre described and analyzed In considerable detail (Kaplan and Simon In press). However in order to establish a psychological context for the simulation which follows, I will re-terate some of those oharacterstics here.
First, the switch in representation from the generic concept of 'square" to the elaborated concepts of 'black square" and "white square" Is at the heart of the Mutilated Checkerboard's difficulty. More specifically, If we dlstingutsh between time spent exploring various approaches prior to switching ispreewait on, and time spent on the problem after the switch, it becomes clear that most of the probler's dificulty sterns from Intialexplradon of fruitless paths prior to the switch. Once the switch has been mad., the prpof is tfvi for ma"y sruys ects.
.
The tch I representation Itself occurs quite rapidly I what one sub)e retrospectlveyc "ed 'a flash of insight.'. Figure 2 presents the protocol transcripts'from three of tt4 morbariculate subjects before, during, and after representational change. 1 Notice that the total episode -from receiving the hint or first becoming aware of the Idea of parity (e.g. the alternating color pattern), throtigh the actual iit in representation (which Is not always clearly delineated), to the generation of a rough proof of Impossibility -Is fairly brief. Typically, it takes less than one minute. This short time span stands In stark contrast to the 20 to 45 minutes that subjects typically spend exploring fruitless paths (even though they are given periodic hints to prod them along!).
'These protocob wre taken from a study (Keplan and Shmon in press) In which several different versions of the Mutilated Checkrbosid problem were used. The version differed In that sonetine the s uares were lbed with the alternating words such as 'bIred and "bute Instead of actualy beng different olor. However, the reader should feel free to translate 'bread" and 'butesr "i'k and 'pink" 
1:
Maybe it has to do with the words on the page? I haven't tried anything with that.
Maybe that's it. Ok, dominos, um, the dominos can only fit ... alright, the dominos can fit over two squares, and no matter which way you put it because it cannot go diagonally, it has nto fit over a butter and a bzead. And because you crossed out two beads, it ha. to leave two butters left over to it doesn't .. . only 30, it won't fit. Is that the answer?
. .
IXCRT -LASTS: 48 Sacs.
2: There's an even number of squares, so it's possible depending on the placement... so it has to be the placement.. Figur 2: The AHAI Experence (3 Protocol Excerpts)
-. I sugest ta the rapid generalon of the rough proo once sul"cs sch to the epproprts represaiWOm earrespon to a relatively strWghltglwrd appliation of ft Og.ri knowedge. On the other hwW, te kd (rW lm Onmin) probleM SON can be intpreed as sarch trouh a large space of potential cues without powerful heuristics to narrow that search. How subjects eventually arrive at cues which trigger a switch In representation Is discussed elsewhere (Kaplan and Simon In press). The purpose of the production system simulation, SWITCH, Is to demonstrat, a set of mecdnlsms sufficient to explain the actual switch of representation itself, and to explain how t switch might lead to a rapid solution. SWITCH alms to Illumlnate those processes that ae hkIden In the pause and unspoken words of the brief verbal protocols In Figure 2 .
The SWITCH Simulation
Before plunging ahead with the actual performance of SWITCH, we must establish some basic facts about Soar -the particular production system chosen for Implementing SWITCH. We also should attend to the features of Soar that have psychological meaning In SWITCH, and to the knowledge that SWITCH starts with.
Soar Basics SWITCH makes primary use only of the fact that Soar Is a production system (i.e. It supports a set of rules that match against the contents of WM to see If they are Instantiated.) However, Soar Is also an architecture for general intelligence possessed of a number of special features that make ft unique among production systems (Laird, Rosenbloom, & Newell 1986).2
Soar's claims that all cognition takes place In problem spaces and that all learning occurs by chunking would be critical If SWITCH was expanded to model the entire course of solving the MC problem, as opposed to focussing on the moment of Insight. The psychological claims that are being made at present however, Include only that: 1) The knowledge that subjects have stored in LTM can be represented by productions, 2) that the condition side of the productions specify what retrieval cues might access that knowledge, 3) and that the contents of WM correspond roughly to the contents of the subjects' STM 2 A non-exhaustive ist of twgo. features inchides the followbg: A two-phase processing cycle oonsisng of an elsxwelorn phase dung which productions fire "n paralr and a decision phase durlng which a new goal. problem s"ae, or operator is made par of the currmntly aetv context, A highly spfed leaN method -chunking, An architecture centered around the notion of proble "@ees., P. goa generation diven by Impasss reached &lrfny problem soMvg. comnbined with the Infomnit that Is perceptaly sdlein the environment.
What SWITCH Starts With
SWITCH starts with essentially the same Infornation as a subject who has already done a significant anount of unsuccessful problem solng and has just been given a hint to pay attention to the color of squares. In addition to modelling the behavior of the subject, however, SWITCH has the task of modelling the environment in which the subject acts. These two sources of knowledge -knowledge about the task environment, and about the subject's representation of that environment -have been carefully distinguished and separated In to SWITCH. Specifically, SWITCH is given the following information at the start of a simulation run. . * A model of the real world problem (e.g. representations of squares, dominos, the adjacency relationships between squares) * A model of the human subject's represen ion of the real world problem, Including concepts that have been generated during problem soling, prior to receiving the color hint (e.g. a concept of ag ehelc square, the proposition that a domino covers two squares)
* An assumed focus of attention (i.e. a 2x2 patch of the board that Is referred to first when the simulation needs information about real world squares)
" A set of fairly general productions corresponding to well learned inference rules presumably possessed by adult subjects (e.g. if one proposition appears true based on observation and the same proposition seems false logically, then a contradiction exists).
" Strategic knowledge (Implemented In domain specific productions for the purpose of this version of the simulation) corresponding to general strategies such as: "pursue hot Ideas" or 'change to finer grain size upon fallure.'
" A hint (corresponding to that given to subjects) that the parity (e.g. color) of the squares Is important. While the RWEs are necessary In that the simulation must model the task domain, the way these units are represented In SWITCH Is Irrelevant to the subject's Internal representation of the problem. Hence there Is no psychological claim at the RWE level.
How
3Note: The complet. Sow code for SWITCH, along wfUh a sample execution brc can be found in Appendix A In m,.,wst, the IRCs and Propositions correspond to a human subject's representaton of th problem.
The man psydwWW claim here Is that the representation Is hierarchical in nature. One might think of the IRas W pesentationl primitives which are combined In different ways to produce various proposit~ons.
SWITCH's hlerarchlal representation of knowledge provides It with two basic methods of solving problems: 1) It can try to produce new combinations of the primitives it already has In the hopes that the new propositions will trigger some useful knowledge that it has already learned, or 2) It can try to elaborate the IRCs In the hopes that changing the building blocks themselves will eventually result In useful proposItions.
The best way to get a feel for how the simulation works Is to examine a production and see what It does. Figure 3 (below) presents the production that performs the actual shift in representation. This production matches on a hint and then checks to see If any relevant IRCs exist that are unelaborated with respect to the attribute that the hint refers to. Thus, If the hint says to attend to the color of the squares, the production may find an IRC corresponding to a generic square -that Is to the concept of "squareness" without any value for color. At this point, the production looks at the board (the RWEs) to see If the squares in the real world have color. They do, so the production maps the color from the real world square to a new IRC that possesses all the previous attributes of the generic square, but now also specifies the square's color. Thus, by 'analogy' to the real world, the simulation Is able to shift from an intlal representation of *square', to a representation of "black square" or 'white square.' A similar production allows the simulation to elaborate old propositions using new IRCs. Thus the proposition "A domino covers a square and a square" may become 'A domino covers a black square and a white square.
4
'The detaib of hie poodadloo., named EIboreft-propoeRiono-by..nogy, can be found In Appndx A. Note that knowledge in this uintiutlon monotonc eo the old prpostion W not acualy transformed, but rather a new proposition b created using th old propoeon as a nple from wch to w ohe."
Production: elaborate-concept-by-analogy IF: The goal is to prove the problem impossible, AND The operator is to elaborate a representation, AND A hint exists saying pay attention to some attribute (e.g. COLOR), AND Some representational concepts (e.g. the concept of squares) exist that have no value for the attribute in question (e.g. COLOR), AND There are some real world referents for the representational concepts that can be referred to (e.g. the squares which really exist on the board)
THEN:
Map the value of the hinted-at attribute (e.g. COLOR) from the real world objects (e.g. real squares) to the representational concept of the objects (e.g. representation of squares). 2) Decide to elaborate IRCs. (This strategic decision reflects the fact that the &imlation has been stuck up to this point, and examines the representational primitives since no progress has been made at the higher propositional level).
3) Ulaborate concepts by analogy.
(The simlation comes up with the new IRCs of "black square" and "white square').
4)
Decide to generate propositions. (Once new XRCs have been generated, the strategy of "pursue hot ideas" dictates that the simulation check what the implications of the new conceptual primitives will be at the propositional level).
5) Elaborate propositions by analogy.
(The simalation produces the proposition that a domino covers a "black square" and a "white square").
6) Xnfer equal numers covered.
(The newly generated proposition --stop 5 --triggers knowledge that equal numbe:s of the two types of squares must be covered.
Pilot data indicates that subjects have a production similar to this in general form).
7) Check actual numbers covered.
(Since the simulation is working within the general context of the schema "Proof by contradiction," every new fact must be checked against reality) 8) Detect a contradiction and exclaim "Impossible!" 9) Decide to generate a reason for impossibility.
(Again, the proof context dictates that the simulation search for a reason for the contradiction) 10) Trace back from contradiction. (The simulation has stored the source of its proposition --logically deduced, or empirically observed --and is able to recall them).
11) State rough proof.
(The simulation uses general knowledge about proofs to frame the information it has recalled).
The behavior outlined above captures very well the behavior of some subjects from the time they receive a hint to the time they generate a rough proof, however the majority of subjects deviated In various ways from the account Just presented. Since an examination of the protocols reveals that the seeds of these deviations can often be traced to behavior during earlier problem solving, many Individual differences could probably be captured In a sImulation of the entire problem solving episode. With regard to change of representation, however, subjects seem remarkably consistent in showing surprise, and then rapid utlzation of the new rep esentetion. Thus, although there w knlvdkk dlerencee In the paths that subjects take once they have changed representations, there is no need to suppose that there Is any variabillty In Uw mechanism undertyIng the representaional shift Itself.
Conclusions
SWITCH makes a number of psychological claims. First, there is a general correspondences between the production system architecOure aNd the psychological notion of refeval from LTM. Moreover, the infonation 'buNt In" to the simulation corresponds the Information that human subjects could reasonably be expected to have.
Second, the hierarchical representation scheme (e.g. the levels of RWEs, IRCs, and propositions) seems psychologicaly valid. That Is, It seems reasonable that representatlom we build of more finely gralned representational units from the level below. However, It remains to be seen where the boundaries to these levels might be, and to what degree changes at one level are lkely to affect the representations at anohler.
Third, the simulation has Incorporated the heuristics of "change grain size upon faliure and 'pursue hot Ideas.' While there Is some Indication that subjects use these strategies In # Mutilated checkerboard problem, the generality of these heuristics needs to be tested further.
Fourth, the tallure of the simulation to match the behavior of all of the subjects emphasizes the Importance of Individual differences In problem solving. Many of these individual differences could probably be captured in a simulation of the entire problem solving episode (including the many false starts that typlcally precede Insight).
Finally, the simulation provides a mechanism for changing representations (analogical mappng), and iustrates how general knowledge, together with a hint, Is sufficient to produce the phenomenon of Insight
In the MC problem.
APPENDIX A: -The Soar Simulation:
Trace and Documented Soar Code 0 g: gOO005 1:1 load-top-goal 1:2 DECIDE problem-space pO0006 1 p: pO0006 proof-by-contradiction 2:3 load-problem-features 2:4 DECIDE state s00007 2 s: s00007 3:5 create-generate-proposition 3:5 create-elaborate-representation 3:5 load-initial-propositions 3:5 load-initial-concepts 3:5 load-hints 3:6 default-prefer-elaborate-representation 3:7 DECIDE operator o00049 3 o: o00049 elaborate-representation 4:8 elaborate-concept-by-analogy 4:8 elaborate-concept-by-analogy 4:9 nevstate*set-up-state-for-copying 4:10 newstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 4:10 nevstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 4:10 newstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 4:11 DECIDE state n00064 4 s: n00064 5:12 default*no-operator-retry 5:12 create-generate-proposition 5:12 create-elaborate-representation 5:13 prefer-generate-propositionl 5:14 DECIDE operator o00065 5 o: o00065 generate-proposition 6:15 elaborate-propositions-by-analogy 6:16 newstate*set-up-state-for-copying 6:16 infer-equal-numbers-covered 6:17 nevstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 6:17 newstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 6:17 newstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 6:17 newstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 6:17 nevstate*copy-valid-state-attributes 6:17 make-count-proposition 6:18 contradiction-found The problem is impossiblel 6:19 DECIDE state n00068 6 s: n00068 7:20 default*rto-operator-retry 7:20 create-generate-proposition 7:20 create-elaborate-representation 7:20 create-find-reason 7:21 prefer-generate-proposition2 7:21 prefer-generate-proposition1 7:21 prefer-find-reason 7:22 DECIDE operator o00072 7 o: o00072 find-reason 8:23 trace-back-contradiction For the problem to be possible, it must be true that number black square equal number white square since domino covers black square and white square But, it is false that number black square equal number white square by empirical observation. Therefore, the problem is impossible. "End --Explicit Halt" (goal <g> -problem-space undecided -"supergoal) (goal <g> ^name prove-impossible) (problem-space <p> ^name proof-by-contradiction) (preference <p> ^role problem-space ^value acceptable ^goal <g>)
(sp load-problem-features ;; Load a set of Real World Elements (RWEs) ;; corresponding to the physical squares, dominos, and adjacent-squares. ;; These elements correspond to the problem-itself as opposed to a human's representation of the problem.
(goal <g> "problem-space <p> ^state undecided -'supergoal) (problem-space <p> ^name proof-by-contradiction) (preference <s> ^role state ^value acceptable ^problem-space <p> "state undecided) (state <s> ^rw <rv> "ks <ks>) (rye <rwl> 'name domino ^shape rectangle ^area 2 "number-of 1 function coverer) (rye <rw2> ^name square ^shape square ^area 1 "number-of 1 'position 1 "color-of black -function coveree ^status removed) (rwe <rw3> 'name square ^shape square ^area 1 "number-of 1 ^position 2 "color-of white ^function coveree ^status present) (rwe <rw4> 'name square ^shape square *area 1 "number-of 1 ^position 3 "color-of black ^function coveree ^status present) (rwe <rw5> ^name square ^shape square ^area 1 ^number-of 1 'position 4 "color-of white 'function coveree "status present) (rwe <rw6> ^name square ^shape square ^area 1 ^number-of 1 'position 5 color-of black ^function coveree ^status present) (rwe <rw7> ^name square ^shape square ^area 1 "number-of 1 'position 6
.color-of white ^function coveree 'status present) (rye <rw8> 'name square ^shape square ^area 1 "number-of 1 *position 7
